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1. Introduction 
Current research and development on the Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) has focused on the 
design of safety systems that will remove the decay heat during accident conditions, ion 
irradiations of candidate ceramic materials, joining studies of oxide dispersion strengthened 
alloys; and within the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) the fabrication of carbide fuels and 
ceramic fuel matrix materials, development of non-halide precursor low density and high density 
ceramic coatings, and neutron irradiation of candidate ceramic fuel matrix and metallic materials.  
The vast majority of this work has focused on the reference design for the GFR: a helium-cooled, 
direct power conversion system that will operate with an outlet temperature of 850ºC at 7 MPa. 
In addition to the work being performed in the United States, seven international partners under 
the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) have identified their interest in participating in 
research related to the development of the GFR.  These are Euratom (European Commission), 
France, Japan, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  Of these, 
Euratom (including the United Kingdom), France, and Japan have active research activities with 
respect to the GFR.  The research includes two main projects: the GFR design and safety project, 
and the GFR fuels/in-core materials/fuel cycle project. 
Previous work performed on safety system design has included the analysis of a 600MWt block-
type (cercer) core, and indicate that 1) a fully passively safe GFR design is possible, but the 
economics demonstrate a prohibitively high cost due to the fuel and fuel cycle; 2) more 
economical systems appear to have a common requirement of a containment backpressure for 
use in the passive/natural convection mode; 3) the injection of a heavy gas (e.g., nitrogen, carbon 
dioxide, etc.) greatly enhances natural convection, and reduces the absolute backpressure needed; 
4) active systems (e.g., blowers) would require very little power (~ 100kW x 3), and may show 
greater reliability as compared to their passive counterparts; and 5) a combined active/passive 
system with a minimal backpressure of 5 bar requires even less power (~ 16kW x 3) for the 
active side, i.e., a blower is run for the first 24 hours of an accident, and then shuts down to allow 
solely natural convective cooling to occur for the remainder of the accident period.  In addition 
to the block core, a 600MWt, low-pressure drop pin core was also examined, where purely 
natural convective cooling was used to remove the decay heat.  Figure 1-1 shows the relationship 
of EHX pressure drop (y-axis) to decay power (x-axis) based on the desired outlet temperatures 
and coolants.  Again, as can be seen in the figure, the use of a heavy gas greatly enhances the 
ability to remove the decay heat during postulated accidents. 
The remainder of this report is a compilation of work performed during this fiscal year (FY05) 
on passive (natural convective) decay heat removal systems for a 2400MWt GFR pin core.  This 
report satisfies the two Level 2 milestones, “Selection of one or more advanced concepts for 
GFR decay heat removal that will maintain the reactor in a safe condition during an accident” for 
the Idaho National Laboratory (workpackage G-I0401K01), and “Select one or more advanced 
concepts for GFR decay heat removal which will maintain the reactor in a safe condition during 
postulated accidents” for Brookhaven National Laboratory (workpackage G-Y0401K01), due on 
September 15, 2005. 
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Figure 1-1 – Natural Convection for Pin-Bundle Core. 
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2. Passive Decay Heat Removal for a 2400 MW Pin Core by Natural 
Circulation 
A series of transient analysis using the system code RELAP5/ATHENA [2-1] has been 
performed to assess decay heat removal by natural circulation cooling under postulated accident 
conditions. The analysis is for a helium-cooled reactor of pin core design with a power density of 
100 W/cc and a thermal power of 2400 MW. The objective is to ensure that the maximum fuel 
temperature remains within acceptable limits (< 1600qC) following a depressurization accident 
with scram and total loss of AC power.
The removal of decay heat from the core will follow the initiation of the depressurization 
accident in two steps. Initially, heat will be removed by a combination of flow coastdown due to 
inertia of the power conversion system and system depressurization caused by coolant flowing 
out of the break from the primary system. Following this step a self-sustaining method for long-
term heat removal of the core will be required. A passive mode of heat removal relying on 
natural circulation cooling is investigated in this report. An emergency heat exchanger loop 
outside the reactor vessel will transfer energy from the reactor to an ultimate heat sink located 
outside the guard containment. By the opening of a check valve inline with the emergency heat 
exchanger a natural circulation flow path is established through the core and between the upper 
plenum and downcomer of the reactor vessel. Radiative heat transfer has also been included in 
the model to account for the exchange of thermal energy between heat structures by radiation.  
 In order for natural circulation cooling to function efficiently the primary system and the 
containment will need to be pressurized to ensure a sufficiently high coolant density. This will be 
accomplished by having a guard containment structure around the primary system. The main 
objective of the analysis reported here is to evaluate the effects of guard containment 
backpressure on the effectiveness of natural circulation cooling. 
2.1 RELAP5/ATHENA Model 
A RELAP5 model of the reactor system has been constructed to address different parametric 
effects that influence the steady state and transient behavior of the pin core under natural 
circulation cooling at decay heat power levels. The model consists of two power conversion unit 
loops, an emergency heat exchanger loop with its heat sink, and a guard containment 
surrounding the primary system. The actual power plant will be constructed using four power 
conversion loops. However, in the RELAP model three loops are combined into one large loop 
(1800 MW), and one loop (600 MW) is isolated in order to correctly model the depressurization 
dynamics, since the leak flow will emanate from only one of the power conversion loops. This 
arrangement is shown schematically on Figure 2-1. Several volumes are used to represent the 
core and the pressure vessel, and the fuel and metal components are represented as heat 
structures. Thermal radiation is accounted for between the heat structures. The core has multiple 
axial and radial channels in order to represent both axial and radial power distributions. The 
shutdown and emergency cooling system is sized to handle 2% decay heat removal by natural 
circulation in a 4x50% configuration, i.e. four separate loops of 1% power capacity. In the 
RELAP5 model the emergency heat removal system is represented by one heat exchanger, which 
is sized to handle 2% of full power. Thus, once the decay heat reaches a level of 2 % of full 
power the emergency heat removal system should be able to handle the heat load. The heat 
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exchanger is based on the compact HEATRIC concept (i.e., a printed circuit heat exchanger). 
The primary side coolant is helium, which is used to cool the core, and the secondary side uses 
pressurized water as a working fluid. The ultimate heat sink consists of a large water tank located 
outside the guard containment building.   
Figure 2-1 – Schematic Model of the Reactor System and the Associated Emergency Cooling 
Loop. 
Details of the heat structures used in the RELAP model for convective and radiative heat transfer 
are shown in Figure 2-2. The core model consists of three radial zones and ten axial zones. The 
three radial zones include a hot assembly, a hot zone, and an average zone. Each of the radial 
zones is divided into ten axial zones. Power generation in each zone is obtained from output of 
the reactor physics analysis. Beyond the core there is a radial reflector, shield, core barrel, 
reactor pressure vessel wall and support structure, and finally the guard containment wall. It is 
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seen that explicit heat generation is only modeled in the core volumes. Heat generation in the 
other volumes is of marginal importance, and these structures act only as thermal capacitors. 
Figure 2-2 – Reactor Vessel and Guard Containment Heat Structures. 
The model for determining the heat transfer due to radiation is shown in Figure 2-3. This model 
allows for radial radiation heat transfer only, and couples the hot inner core parts to the cooler 
outer parts. Figure 2-3 is thus a radial section through the core and associated guard containment 
wall, since these are the heat structures involved in the heat transfer process. It is seen that the 
fuel pins radiate to the assembly cans, which in turn radiate to each other. At the outer core 
boundary the element cans radiate to the inner reflector surface, which radiates to the radial 
shield. Finally the shield radiates to the core barrel, which radiates to the reactor pressure vessel, 
and it finally radiates to the guard containment wall. It is assumed that the guard containment 
wall is kept at a constant temperature by a thermal management system embedded in the wall.  
It is clear from the above discussion that the core heat transfer model has both a convective and a 
radiative component. Convectively, heat is removed from the core by helium gas flowing up 
along the fuel pins. This mechanism is either forced or natural convection. The second heat 
transfer mechanism is radiation from the hotter parts of the core to the cooler parts of the core.    
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Figure 2-3 – Heat Structures for Radiation Heat Transfer. 
Details of the primary system and the power conversion unit (PCU) are shown in Figure 2-4. It is 
seen that all the components of the power conversion unit are represented. However, at this stage 
the actual turbine, compressors, and generator models are not complete. The actual models for 
these components, including performance maps and inertia terms, will be added at a later date. 
The primary system depressurization is assumed to take place from a failure in the cold inlet duct 
of the primary circuit. This location is close to the point of highest primary system pressure 
(actually located at the exhaust of the high pressure compressor outlet). Also shown in Figure 2-4 
is the guard containment structure into which the primary coolant exhausts at the time of the 
break.
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Figure 2-4 – Reactor Vessel and Power Conversion Unit Volume arrangement. 
Details of the volume representation of the Shutdown Cooling System/Emergency Cooling 
System (SCS/ECS) are shown in Figure 2-5. The intermediate heat exchanger is based on the 
HEATRIC concept, and is shown in the horizontal orientation. A vertical orientation was also 
examined in the series of analysis reported below. The inlet and outlet of the SCS/ECS loop is 
connected to the upper plenum and the downcomer of the reactor pressure vessel respectively. 
Although the blower volume is explicitly modeled, the actual blower rotating components are not 
included at this stage. The inertia of the drive motor and/or the possible availability of backup 
battery power both of which could assist in forcing coolant to circulate around the primary 
circuit are thus not included in this analysis. This capability will be included in the next stage of 
the analysis.   
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Figure 2-5 – Shutdown Cooling System/Emergency cooling System Volume arrangement. 
2.1.1 Reactor Model for Steady-State Initialization 
As shown in Figure 2-4, the RELAP model represents an integrated depiction of the primary and 
power conversion loops. Table 2-1 provides a summary of the geometric parameters of the inter-
connecting volumes that represent different parts of the reactor vessel, and Table 2-2 provides 
the geometry and initial conditions for one unit of the 600MW PCU. 
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Table 2-1 – Reactor Vessel Geometry 
 *  Includes lower and upper reflectors – 1.0m each. 
Component RELAP5 Volume # 
Length 
(m) Area (m
2) HD (m) 
Upper 
Downcomer 047 3.241 6.775 0.61 
Middle 
Downcomer 
045 & 046 
(in parallel) 4.5 3.3875 0.61 
Lower 
Downcomer 050 7.627 6.775 0.61 
Lower 
Plenum 051 2.68 33.65 6.71 
Core Inlet 052 0.3 17.16 4.68 
Average 
Zone 053 3.347* 6.2487 0.0122 
Hot Zone 054 3.347* 0.9626 0.0122 
Hot
Assembly 055 3.347* 0.1050 0.0122 
Core Outlet 056 0.5 17.16 4.68 
Upper 
Plenum 058 11.5 35.36 6.71 
Radial 
Reflector 032 3.347 0.0154 0.0122 
Radial 
Shield 034 3.347 0.0103 0.0122 
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Table 2-2 – PCU Geometry* and Initial Conditions 
Component Length (m) 
Volume 
(m3)
Area 
(m2)
Orientation 
(Deg) 
Hydraulic 
Diameter (m) 
Hot Duct 7.4 11.88484921 1.6060607 0 1.43
Turbine 4.2 2.04 0.4857143 90 0.786404
Turb - Recu 1.3848 0.6924 0.5 -90 0.797885
Recuperator 2.8152 59.5 21.135266 -90 0.009164
Recu - Prec 10.95 5.475 0.5 -90 0.797885
Precooler 4.73 142.4 30.105708 -90 0.009164
LPC duct 4.9 11.78588119 2.4052819 90 1.75
LPC inlet 2.38 14.23918074 5.982849 90 2.76
LPC 4.2 2 0.4761905 90 0.778656
LPC outlet 4.9 21.3 4.3469388 -90 2.352593
Intercooler 4.73 139.8 29.556025 -90 0.009164
Intc - HPC 9.63 4.815 0.5 90 0.797885
HPC 4.2 2 0.4761905 90 0.778656
HPC-Recu 2 1 0.5 0 0.797885
Recuperator 2.8152 59.5 21.135266 90 0.009164
Recu - Cduct 2.8152 1.4076 0.5 -90 0.797885
Cold Duct 7.4 13.94867138 1.8849556 0 0.6
Total Volume 493.7885825
* Geometry is for one 600MW unit. 
Component Volume Nodes 
Temp 
( C) 
Temp 
(K) 
Pressure 
(MPa) 
Hot Duct 1-4 848 1121.15 7.07 
Turbine 5-7 678 951.15 4.84 
Turb - Recu 8 508 781.15 2.61 
Recuperator 9-10 319 592.15 2.59 
Recu - Prec 11-13 130.3 403.45 2.58 
Precooler 14-17 78.3 351.45 2.56 
LPC duct 18-19 26.4 299.55 2.55 
LPC inlet 20 26.4 299.55 2.55 
LPC 21-23 66.9 340.05 3.43 
LPC outlet 24-25 107.5 380.65 4.31 
Intercooler 26-29 66.8 339.95 4.29 
Intc - HPC 30-32 26 299.15 4.28 
HPC 33-35 68.2 341.35 5.76 
HPC-Recu 36 110.3 383.45 7.24 
Recuperator 37-38 299 572.15 7.2 
Recu - Cduct 39-40 488 761.15 7.16 
Cold Duct 41-44 488 761.15 7.16 
The following is a list of reactor parameters used in the model and is based on the ANL input 
database for the core design [2-2]. 
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Reactor power = 2400 MWt 
System pressure = 7.0 MPa 
Core 'P = 5.2x104 Pa 
Helium flow = 1249 kg/s 
Inlet temperature = 480qC
Outlet temperature = 850qC
The corresponding fuel subassembly parameters are listed in the following. 
Number of hexagonal subassemblies = 418 (including 61 control assemblies) 
Number of fuel pins per subassembly = 271 (234 in control assemblies) 
Pin diameter = 9.65 mm [2-3] 
Clad (SiC) thickness = 1.0 mm [2-3] 
Radial gap (helium) = 0.1 mm [2-3] 
Fuel pellet (UC) diameter = 7.45 mm [2-3] 
Total coolant flow area = 9.1 m2
Channel height = 3.34 m (fissile height = 1.34m) 
Hydraulic diameter = 12.2 mm 
Number of spacer grid assumed = 9 
Spacer grid loss coefficient = 0.65 
Flat-to-flat (outside) of hexagonal subassembly = 215 mm 
Hexagonal wall thickness = 3.7 mm 
Thermal properties of UC and SiC used in the analysis are listed in Table 2-3.  Preliminary 
physics calculation from ANL [2-3] indicated that reactor power is distributed between the core 
and the radial reflector/shield in a ratio of 99.65 % : 0.35 %. Since the energy deposition outside 
the core is negligible 100% of power is assumed to deposit in the three core zones. A flow split 
of 99.65% : 0.35% is assumed between the core and the radial reflector/shield. The reactor core 
is divided into a hot assembly, hot zone, and an average zone. 
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Table 2-3 – Properties of Fuel and Clad for the Pin Core 
Fuel – UC 
Density = 13.61x103 kg/m3
    Thermal Conductivity = 21.6 W/m-K 
Specific Heat = 201 J/kg-K 
Clad - SiC 
Density = 3210 kg/m3
Thermal Conductivity: 
Temperature 
(K)
Thermal Conductivity 
(W/m-K) 
673 25.12 
873 21.77 
1073 18.42 
1273 16.12 
1473 13.40 
Specific Heat: 
Temperature 
(K)
Specific Heat 
(J/kg-K) 
600 1050 
900 1170 
1200 1250 
1500 1320 
The pertinent parameters associated with these zones are given below:  
 Hot Assembly Hot Zone Average Zone 
Number of Assemblies: 
Regular Assembly 
Control Assembly 
6
0
48
7
303
54
Power Fraction (%) 1.7 14.1 84.2 
Relative Radial Power Shape 1.31 1.21 0.967 
The inclusion of the hot assembly as one of the three zones in the core is to simulate the effect of 
pin peaking within the hot zone. The assumed peaking is ~8% ((1.31-1.21)/1.21). Each region is 
sub-divided into 10 axial nodes with mid-core symmetry and a cosine axial power shape. The 
bottom and top nodes represent the axial reflectors (1 m in length) and no heat generation is 
assumed there. The axial power factors in the fueled region, from inlet to mid-core are: 0.82 
(0.101m), 0.91 (0.168m), 1.04 (0.202m), 1.12 (0.202m), where the length of each node is in 
parenthesis. The fuel pins are modeled as cylindrical heat structures with three radial zones, fuel, 
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gas gap, and clad. In parallel with the core channels is the radial reflector/shield volume with its 
own hydraulic channel and heat structure. Details of these passive heat structures (no internal 
heat generation) are discussed later in relation to the modeling of radiation heat transfer. 
2.1.2 Emergency Heat Exchanger System 
Under natural circulation cooling decay power is removed by an in-vessel heat exchanger of 
HEATRIC design. A secondary loop using pressurized water transports the thermal energy, 
again by natural circulation, to an externally located ultimate heat sink. For this analysis the 
emergency heat exchanger system is modeled after an MIT design, shown in Figure 2-5.  The 
HEATRIC heat exchanger consists of alternating layers of helium and pressurized water counter-
current micro-channels. The HEATRIC heat exchanger is represented in the RELAP5 model as a 
plate heat structure separating the counter-current primary and secondary fluids. The secondary 
heat exchanger, located in the ultimate heat sink, consists of a tube and shell design with ten tube 
passes and one shell pass. The shell side is a water tank that represents an ultimate heat sink. The 
tank is assumed to be very large, and if necessary can be refilled. Below is a summary of the heat 
exchanger input data. 
Working fluid = H2O pressurized to 9 MPa 
Length of heat transfer surface = 0.3m 
Plate thickness = 0.0037m 
Heat transfer area = 2360m2
Flow area on the primary and secondary side = 6.01m2
Hydraulic diameter of flow channel = 0.003055m 
Plate conductivity is based on Alloy 800H, 
Kmat(T) = 6.8393 +0.015577T, 
where Kmat is the thermal conductivity in W/m-s and T is the temperature in K. 
The arrangement of the SCS/ECS heat exchanger as it is located in a pod in the guard 
containment is shown in Figure 2-6. 
The following additional; assumptions were made regarding the operation of the emergency 
cooling system: 
1) The HEATRIC flow channels were orientated in the vertical direction. The original 
design had horizontal flow channels. However initial calculations showed a period of 
steam void formation at the start of heat transfer to the water side. For the calculations 
presented in this report the flow channels were oriented vertically to ease the 
establishment of natural circulation flow on the water side.  
2) The difference in height between the core mid-plane and the mid-plane of the emergency 
heat exchanger is 16 m. 
3) The height between the emergency heat exchanger mid-plane and the tube heat exchanger 
mid-plane located in the ultimate heat sink is 8.5 m. 
4) The ultimate heat sink tank is supplied by an external water supply at a rate of 355.2 kg/s 
at a temperature of 30˚ C. 
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5) The external water tank, representing the shell side of the secondary heat exchanger, is 
open to atmosphere and is assumed to have a height of 10m and a flow area of 78.54m2.
6) The tube side of the secondary heat exchanger is made up of 100 tubes with ID = 
0.03505m, OD = 0.04216 and10 tube passes. Total flow area = 0.09649m2 and total heat 
transfer area = 425.14m2 (total heat transfer length = 10x3.21m). 
Figure 2-6 – SCS/ECS heat exchanger located in a pod within the guard containment. 
2.1.3 Radiative Heat Transfer 
The incorporation of radiation heat transfer among heat structures inside the reactor vessel 
provides an additional means of distributing thermal energy from hotter parts to cooler parts of 
the reactor. A simplified approach that is consistent with the lumped representations of fuel pins 
and assembly cans has been adopted to model the transfer of heat by radiation from fuel pins to 
the surrounding assembly cans and subsequently from one zone of the core to the next. 
The heated heat structures (HS), i.e. the fuel pins, identified in Figure 2-2 is the source of energy 
and the unheated heat structures are other components that participate in the exchange of thermal 
energy by radiation. By assumption the zone of influence of radiation heat transfer is limited to 
the cylindrical section that coincides with the vertical extent of the fueled region of the core. As 
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an example, though the core barrel extends to the upper plenum, only the lower portion between 
the lower and upper boundaries of the fueled zone (1.347m in height) participates in radiation 
heat transfer. 
The corresponding radiation heat transfer surfaces considered in the ATHENA model of the pin 
core are: 
1. Fuel pins in each core zone (hot assembly, hot zone, and average zone, as shown in 
Figure 2-3) radiate to the corresponding hexagonal (hex) cans in the zone. 
2. Hot assembly hex can radiates to hot zone hex can. 
3. Hot zone hex can radiates to average zone hex can. 
4. Average zone hex can radiates to radial reflector. 
5. Radial reflector radiates to radial shield. 
6. Radial shield radiates to core barrel. 
7. Core barrel radiates to vessel wall. 
8. Vessel wall radiates to vessel support structure. 
9. Vessel support structure radiates to guard containment wall. 
Once the radiating surfaces have been identified the other parameter of interest for radiation heat 
transfer is the view factor. In ATHENA the two rules that govern the definition of view factors 
for two interacting surfaces are: 
Ai Fij = Aj Fji
6Fij = 1 (For a given i sum over j) 
where,
Ai = area of radiating surface i 
Fij = view factor from surface i to surface j 
In this report the view factors for a given pair of radiating surfaces (Ai and Aj) are evaluated by 
assuming that the two surfaces are two-dimensional concentric cylinders. According to the 
conceptualized radiating surfaces shown in Figure 2-3, the inner cylinder (A1) sees 100% of the 
outer cylinder (A2) and this gives F12 =1 that enables the determination of the rest of view factors 
for the pair of surfaces A1 and A2. The situation for radiative transfer between the fuel pins and 
the surrounding hex can walls is a little different. In this case the fuel pins have a total surface 
area (A1) greater than the corresponding surface area of the hex cans (A2) and F21 is set to unity 
instead. Physically the interpretation of setting F21 =1 (hex can to fuel pin) is equivalent to 
treating the hex can as seeing 100% of the fuel pins while the fuel pins only see part of the hex 
can surface because the fuel pins see each other. This interpretation is consistent with the use of 
one lumped fuel pin to represent all the fuel pins in a core zone, i.e. fuel pins radiate to each 
other to achieve the same temperature at each axial location in a particular core zone. 
Some of the input parameters for the heat structures that participate in radiation heat transfer are 
summarized below. 
 16
Radial reflector: 
Inner radius = 2.4265m 
Outer radius = 2.6955m 
Material = Inconel 
Radial shield: 
Inner radius = 2.8175m 
Outer radius = 3.2785m 
Material = Inconel 
Core barrel: 
Inner radius = 3.355m 
Outer radius = 3.38m 
Material = stainless steel 
Reactor vessel wall: 
Inner radius = 3.6856m 
Outer radius = 3.965 
Reactor support structure: 
Inner radius = 5.77m 
Outer radius = 6.67m 
Material = concrete 
Guard containment wall: 
Wall thickness = 0.02m 
Material = concrete  
An arbitrarily thin wall was used to simulate a wall that is close to the temperature of the outside 
temperature of 30 deg C. The boundary condition prescribed for the guard containment wall is an 
approximation to the design assumption that the guard containment wall is kept at a constant 
temperature by a thermal management system embedded in the wall.  
The transient results indicate that the main effect of radiative heat transfer is the redistribution of 
energy among heat structures internal to the vessel. Radiative heat transfer to the guard 
containment wall is insignificant because of relatively low reactor vessel wall temperature. 
2.1.4 Transient Boundary Conditions and Cases 
In order to carry out a transient analysis of a thermal-hydraulic system both initial and boundary 
conditions need to be specified. In the cases to be considered here the following conditions will 
be specified: 
1) Reactor initially at full power. 
2) A 0.00645 m² (1.0 in²) rupture in the number one loop (600 MW) of the PCU cold leg 
initiates the transient. 
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3) Appropriate volumes represent power conversion unit, but no actual turbo-compressor 
model is included in the model.
4) Transient response of the turbo-compressor unit is modeled by linearly reducing the flow 
from the PCU into the primary loop. A ramp down time of 180 s. was assumed. 
5) Guard containment volume is an input variable the magnitude of which is to be 
determined by the results of the transient analysis. Initially pressure and temperature were 
assumed to be 1 atmosphere and 30º C.  The guard containment outside wall temperature 
was assumed to be at a steady state value of 30º C. It is assumed that the temperature is 
maintained by an outside independent heat removal system.   
The primary objective of this analysis is to determine the volume and final temperature and 
pressure of the guard containment that result in acceptable core long term cooling of the core. 
Acceptable cooling of the core is defined by the conditions that result in the maximum hot pin 
surface temperature being below 1800 K. By varying the guard containment volume the final 
pressure in the guard containment also varies, and this value determines the density and thus the 
mass flow rate of the coolant flowing through the core. Higher guard containment pressures 
result in higher coolant mass flow rates and thus more efficient cooling. However, they also 
imply thicker guard containment walls and thus potentially more costly structures. 
2.2 ATHENA Transient Analysis 
The first step of a transient analysis was to establish a steady-state at 100% power. The current 
models of the PCU do not include a compressor component and so initial flow is established by 
imposing upstream and downstream pressures in the reactor vessel, given the system pressure of 
7.0MPa and a core pressure drop of 5.72x104Pa. With a helium inlet temperature of 480qC, the 
spacer loss coefficient is adjusted until an outlet temperature of 850qC is reached at the outlet of 
the reactor.  
A transient case is run as a restart of the steady-state case from time zero. Simultaneously the 
restart case establishes new connections to the RPV at time zero. These include new flow 
junctions with the PCU via the cold and hot ducts and the guard containment via the break 
junction (simulated by a trip valve). Specifically the restart input file contains information for the 
break junction (flow area), the guard containment (volume, initial pressure and temperature), the 
PCU initial pressure and temperature distribution, time-dependent junction velocity between 
PCU and RPV inlet to simulate forced flow coastdown. The coast-down of forced flow is 
simulated by varying the junction flow velocity linearly from the initial value to zero in a 
specified time period. The nominal coastdown period is 180 seconds. At the end of the 
coastdown, a valve is tripped open to provide a flow path between the PCU outlet and the 
downcomer of the reactor. The break is initiated at time zero of a transient case and the reactor is 
tripped on an upper plenum pressure of 6.0MPa. Reactor power after scram is calculated by the 
RELAP5 point-kinetics model and the fission product decay information specified is ANS79-1. 
2.2.1 Transient Cases 
A series of transient analysis has been done to evaluate the effect of guard containment pressure 
on the passive mode of decay heat removal by natural circulation cooling. The effect of back 
pressure on natural circulation cooling of the pin core is evaluated by parametrically varying the 
free volume of the guard containment. The nominal case (Case 1) has an assumed guard 
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containment volume of 27000 m3 and a final calculated pressure of 0.574MPa. The other cases 
have volumes and final pressures as shown below. 
Case Identification Guard ContainmentFree Volume (m3)
Final Containment Pressure 
(MPa) 
Case 1 27000(Nominal) 0.574
Case 2 0.5 x Nominal 0.901 
Case 3 1.33 x Nominal 0.472 
Case 4 0.75 x Nominal 0.675 
Only two of the four cases resulted in an end state whereby natural circulation cooling has 
sufficient capacity to remove decay heat generated by the 2400 MW core. The results indicate 
that the guard containment back pressure has a dominant effect on the rate of heat removal by 
natural circulation with higher pressure leading to higher flow rate. Results of each parametric 
case and an analysis of the transient results for all four cases considered together are provided in 
the following sections. 
2.2.1.1 Case 1 
This case assumes the guard containment has a nominal free volume of 27000m3. Maximum fuel 
temperature in the hot channel exceeded 1600qC at about 14350s after initiation of the break (see 
Figure 2-12). At that time the pressures in the reactor and the guard containment have 
equilibrated to about 0.57MPa (see Figure 2-9).  
2.2.1.2 Case 2 
This case has a guard containment free volume of 13500 m3 (half that of the nominal value).
Pressures in the reactor and the guard containment converge to about 0.9MPa (see Figure 2-9) at 
the end of the calculation, 21600s after initiation of the break. The emergency heat exchanger is 
able to match the decay power (see Figure 2-7) and the maximum fuel temperature of 1274.4K is 
reached at 13540s (see Figure 2-12). 
2.2.1.3 Case 3 
This case assumes a guard containment volume of 36000 m3, a third larger than the nominal 
volume. The outcome is similar to Case 1. Maximum fuel temperature in the hot channel 
exceeded 1600qC at 13967s after initiation of the break (see Figure 2-12). At that time the 
pressures in the reactor and the guard containment have equilibrated to about 0.47MPa (see 
Figure 2-9). 
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2.2.1.4 Case 4 
This case has a guard containment free volume of 20250 m3 (0.75 that of the nominal value).
Pressures in the reactor and the guard containment converge to about 0.675MPa (see Figure 2-9) 
at the end of the calculation, 24000s after initiation of the break. The emergency heat exchanger 
is able to match the decay power (see Figure 2-7) and the maximum fuel temperature of 1736.9K 
is reached at about 22700s (see Figure 2-12). 
2.2.2 Analysis of Transient Results 
The general progression of the depressurization transient for the four parametric cases is very 
similar and the transient results for all four cases are plotted together to facilitate comparison of 
trends.
2.2.2.1 Heat Removal Rate of the Emergency Cooling System 
Plotted in Figure 2-7 is the rate of heat transfer into the water side of the HEATRIC heat 
exchanger in the emergency cooling system. The reactor power also is shown in the figure for 
comparison.
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Figure 2-7 – Reactor power and Emergency Heat Exchanger heat removal rate. 
The initial surge in the heat removal rate is due to the hydraulic transient on the water side of the 
heat exchanger (see Figure 2-15). A comparison between Figures 2-7, 2-8 and 2-9 shows that as 
the reactor pressure comes into equilibrium with the guard containment pressure, indicating an 
end to the depressurization phase of the transient, there is a slow migration of the heat exchanger 
heat removal rate towards the reactor power. This trend is indicative of the approach to a quasi-
steady state where the natural circulation heat removal rate matches that of the reactor power. 
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2.2.2.2 Reactor Pressure 
The pressure of the reactor upper plenum is shown in Figure 2-8. With the initiation of the break 
at time zero, the current RELAP5/ATHENA model assumes a linear coastdown of flow velocity 
from the power conversion unit (PCU) to the reactor. This is an interim scheme to simulate the 
behavior of a tripped PCU until a compressor/turbine model is developed for a more realistic 
representation of the PCU. The mean initial pressure of the PCU is less than the reactor pressure. 
With no rotating machinery in the current model to provide hydraulic head in the PCU, helium 
gas in the reactor quickly depressurizes into the PCU volumes. This results in a rapid drop in 
reactor pressure at time zero. The rest of the depressurization is more gradual and is due to 
leakage through the break into the guard containment. For much of the depressurization transient 
the helium flow through the leak is choked and thus all four parametric cases have similar reactor 
pressure until the point the reactor pressure equalizes with the guard containment pressure. In the 
two failed cases (Cases 1 and 3) the peak clad temperature exceeds the limit of 1600qC after the 
reactor pressure has dropped below 0.6MPa. If reliance on natural circulation cooling is delayed 
after a depressurization accident, e.g. by means of other active heat removal mechanisms such as 
battery powered blower, then natural circulation alone can become sufficient to removal decay 
power even at a guard containment pressure lower than 0.6MPa. 
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Figure 2-8 – Reactor pressure in the upper plenum. 
2.2.2.3 Guard Containment Pressure 
There are several factors that determine the pressure build up in the guard containment after a 
leak in the reactor primary circuit. They are: 
1. Initial state of the guard containment atmosphere, i.e. temperature, pressure, and volume. 
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2. Presence of heat structure to absorb sensible heat inside the guard containment. 
3. Presence of active cooling device in the guard containment. 
4. Through wall heat transfer to the outside. 
5. Energy and mass transfer through the leak into the guard containment. 
In Figure 2-9 the rate of pressure build up is seen to vary inversely with the assumed free volume 
of the guard containment. A peak pressure is reached when the combined heat removal from the 
Emergency Cooling System and heat conduction through the guard containment wall exceeds the 
decay power. 
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Figure 2-9 – Guard containment pressure. 
It is noted that there are three means to mitigate the peak pressure inside the guard containment, 
by increasing the free volume, by vent the guard containment, and by using active heat removal. 
The viability of these means to minimize the peak pressure needs further evaluation. 
2.2.2.4 Guard Containment Gas Temperature 
The gas temperature of the guard containment increases rapidly after the initiation of the 
depressurization accident because of the relatively low heat capacity of its atmosphere. Figure 2-
10 shows that the peak gas temperature varies inversely with the free volume of the guard 
containment. A high gas temperature is of concern not only for the environmental qualification 
of equipment and instruments inside the guard containment but also for the structural integrity of 
the support structures and the guard containment itself. 
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2.2.2.5 Hot Assembly Fuel Temperature 
The general trend of the temperature transient experienced by the fuel is discussed with the aid of 
Figure 2-11, which shows the average temperature of the fuel node of the hot assembly near top 
of the core. The behavior of the fuel temperature is seen to be similar for all four parametric 
cases. The only difference is the attainment of a peak temperature for the two successful cases. 
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Figure 2-10 – Gas temperature inside the guard containment. 
The initial drop in fuel temperature after the initiation of the transient is due to the rapid decrease 
in reactor power from operating level to decay heat level. The first temperature peak of slightly 
less than 1200K is from a combination of an increase in core inlet temperature (partly due to the 
approximate representation of the PCU in the current model) and a decrease in heat loss from the 
fuel when the flow from the PCU coasts down to zero. The duration of the coastdown has been 
found to be an important factor in deciding the magnitude of this first peak in fuel temperature. 
As natural circulation flow begins to develop through the core the rate of heat transfer from the 
fuel begins to increase again resulting in a decrease in fuel temperature. While the decay power 
is decreasing in time the natural circulation flow through the core is also slowing down because 
of loss in pressure through the leak. A minimum fuel temperature is reached at about 4000s into 
the transient and from that point on the fuel temperature begins an upward trend. With increasing 
fuel temperature the amount of heat transfer from the fuel into the flowing helium also increases. 
For the two success cases (Cases 2 and 4) the decay power eventually drops below the level that 
is sustainable by the helium flow and at a time before the fuel temperature limit is reached. 
2.2.2.6 Maximum Fuel Temperature 
Figure 2-12 shows the maximum fuel temperature as a function of time. It is obtained from the 
RELAP5/ATHENA results by defining a control variable that searches for the maximum 
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temperature for all fuel heat structures at all axial locations. The behavior of the maximum fuel 
temperature is similar to the nodal temperature shown in Figure 2-11. 
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Figure 2-11 – Hot assembly fuel temperature near top of the core. 
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Figure 2-12 – Maximum fuel temperature core-wide. 
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2.2.2.7 Helium Flow in Natural Circulation 
Natural circulation flow is established when the pressure difference across the check valve in the 
emergency heat exchanger loop has reached a threshold value. The helium flow rate shown in 
Figure 2-13 clearly demonstrates its dependence on the reactor pressure (see Figure 2-8). Higher 
flow rates are achieved at higher pressures. Based on economic and engineering constraints a 
maximum design pressure will be specified for the guard containment and that will have a direct 
bearing on the maximum passive heat removal rate achievable by natural circulation alone.   
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Figure 2-13 – Natural circulation flow rate of helium gas. 
2.2.2.8 Gas Temperature at Core Outlet 
The gas temperature at core outlet, shown in Figure 2-14, generally reflects the rate of heat 
transfer from the core to the helium flow. The progression of the core outlet temperature thus 
follows the trend of the fuel temperature shown in Figure 2-11. 
2.2.2.9 Gas Temperature at Core Inlet 
The initial surge in the core inlet temperature, shown in Figure 2-15, is somewhat unrealistic and 
is due to an approximation in the current PCU model discussed earlier in relation to the reactor 
pressure. In general the trend of the core inlet temperature corresponds to the difference between 
the heat removal rate of the emergency heat exchanger and reactor power. A positive differential 
implies a decrease in core inlet temperature and vice versa.  
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Figure 2-14 – Gas temperature at core outlet. 
2.2.2.10 Water Flow Rate in the HEATRIC Heat Exchanger 
The dynamic behavior of the water flow on the secondary side of the HEATRIC heat exchanger 
is shown in Figure 2-16 for flow at the inlet. The water flow is initiated by the commencement of 
helium flow on the primary side of the heat exchanger following the opening of the check valve. 
Since the water is initially stagnant a sudden influx of heat into the water channel prompted 
steam generation in the flow channel. The generation and collapse of steam voids in the water 
circuit create oscillations in the water flow. Eventually a stable natural circulation flow is 
established on the secondary side of the HEATRIC heat exchanger. Since water is 
incompressible a surge volume is needed to accommodate the thermal expansion of the flowing 
water. The variation of water flow rate among the parametric cases is small. Nonetheless 
qualitatively the result shows a higher water flow rate corresponding to a lower core inlet 
temperature (see Figure 2-15). 
2.2.2.11 Water Temperature at the Outlet of the HEATRIC Heat 
Exchanger 
The initial heat transfer to the water side is fairly high (see Figure 2-7) and this is reflected in the 
two-hundred-degree plus increase in the outlet temperature, as shown in Figure 2-17, a short time 
after flow has started in the heat exchanger. Changes in water temperature correspond to 
variations in the heat removal rate of heat exchanger. This indicates the operation of the 
secondary side is stable and follows the demand of the primary side. 
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Figure 2-15 – Gas temperature at core inlet. 
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Figure 2-16 – Water flow rate in the HEATRIC heat exchanger. 
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Figure 2-17 – Water temperature at the outlet of the HEATRIC heat exchanger. 
2.2.2.12 Impact of Radiative Heat Transfer 
The contribution of radiation heat transfer to the overall cooling of the fuel pins is demonstrated 
by the following tabulation that shows the energy balance for the upper half of the fuel pin in the 
hot assembly for Case 4 at the end of the calculation (24000s). 
Heat Structure 
Node Number 
Loss by 
Radiation (W) 
Loss by 
Convection (W)
Power Source 
(W) 
Net Loss of 
Power (W) 
550006 12796 44351 56987 159.71 
550007 14102 38994 52931 165.25 
550008 11292 27168 38335 124.76 
550009 6362 14334 20629 67.159 
The heat structure temperatures and the coolant temperatures are shown below. 
 28
Heat Structure 
Node Number 
Length of Node 
(m) 
Fuel 
Temperature 
(K)
HEX Can 
Temperature 
(K)
Coolant
Temperature 
(K)
550006 0.20205 1408.64 1378.97 1382.74 
550007 0.20205 1567.93 1543.47 1546.71 
550008 0.168381 1677.87 1658.29 1660.90 
550009 0.101029 1735.77 1718.96 1721.17 
The above tabulation shows that radiation accounts for 20-30% of the power loss from the fuel 
pin in the hot assembly. Radiation heat transfer becomes less significant for heat structures as 
their distance from the hot assembly is increased.  The presence of unheated heat structures 
inside the reactor vessel increases the heat capacity of the system and this also helps to lower the 
heatup of the helium gas inside the vessel. 
2.3 Summary and Conclusions 
The analysis of depressurization transient reported here for the 2400MW pin core design is an 
extension of an earlier analysis [2-4] for a 600MW core with half the power density of the 
current design (50W/cc versus the current 100W/cc). Major differences between the earlier 
analysis and the current one are in the fuel pin dimensions, the core power distribution, and the 
design of the emergency cooling system. In particular, the emergency heat exchangers are now 
located ex-vessel and compressed water is used as the working fluid on the secondary side.  In 
addition, radiation heat transfer is included in the current analysis. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from this preliminary study: 
1) With a 100W/cc core power density the sensitivity of maximum fuel temperature to core 
power distribution has pointed to the need of a more uniform core power distribution radially 
and axially. 
2) Fuel pin design (pellet size, gap and clad thickness) also has a significant impact on the fuel 
temperature response in a depressurization accident. 
3) In order to maintain the maximum fuel temperature within acceptable limits, the guard 
containment pressure must be at least ~ 0.675 MPa. This pressure implies that the free 
volume of the guard containment can be no greater than 20,250 m3.
4) Heat structures and radiative heat transfer are important phenomena in the post-accident 
thermal progression of the core. The effect of including these phenomena is to re-distribute 
the radial temperature profile compared to not including them. Briefly, the hot zones (fuel) 
are reduced in temperature, and the cold zones (reflector, shield etc.) are increased in 
temperature relative to not including the above mentioned phenomena.   
5) The coolant flow due to the coast down of the Turbine-Compressor-Generator (TCG) unit is 
an important factor in initially cooling the core following reactor scram, and in establishing 
the natural circulation flow. Currently this flow is approximated by linearly reducing the flow 
velocity to zero in 180 seconds. A more realistic model of this flow reduction (both mass 
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flow rate and time) is required to make more accurate estimates of the maximum fuel 
temperature, and ultimately the guard containment volume. In order to carry out this more 
realistic calculation, a complete Turbine Compressor model is required. This model will 
require the appropriate performance maps, inertia of the rotating parts, and some estimate of 
the internal friction of the blades rotating in the working fluid. 
6) The emergency heat exchanger needs to be orientated in a vertical direction rather than 
horizontally, to avoid boiling of the pressurized water on the secondary side. The hot helium 
initially leaving the core causes the water on the secondary side to boil in the case of a 
horizontally orientated heat exchanger. This boiling induces flow oscillations, and potentially 
reverse flow on the secondary side, impeding the onset of natural circulation flow. These 
events are minimized in the case where the heat exchanger is oriented vertically, and the start 
of natural circulation flow proceeds smoothly.  
7) Helium flow caused by either coast down or normal operation using emergency power 
supply (battery) of the ECS blower is not included in this calculation. This additional flow 
will help in establishing the natural circulation flow pattern following the start of the accident 
and also reduce the requirement of natural circulation cooling by prolonging the period of 
forced flow cooling. However, natural circulation flow is established in the current analysis, 
despite not including this flow. Thus, it would seem that including this flow is not crucial to 
cooling the core but its inclusion is necessary to create an accurate model of the accident 
progression.
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3. Effects of the Reactor Cavity Cooling System 
The ATHENA analysis presented here examines the effects of the reactor cavity cooling system 
(RCCS) on decay heat removal for a gas-cooled reactor during a depressurization accident. The 
new analysis is an extension of a previous study [3-1] that assessed the performance of decay 
heat removal by natural circulation cooling under a depressurization accident for a helium-cooled 
reactor. In the previous analysis passive decay heat removal is enabled by an emergency cooling 
system (ECS) that directs by natural circulation the hot helium gas from the reactor to an ex-
vessel heat exchanger. A dominant factor in determining the effectiveness of natural circulation 
cooling is the system pressure. A higher pressure results in a denser gas and that leads to a higher 
buoyancy head and subsequently a higher flow rate. In a depressurization accident initiated by a 
component breach the pressures of the reactor vessel and the guard containment will converge to 
an intermediate value. The impact of this common pressure on the maximum fuel temperature 
has been evaluated parametrically in the previous study. In that analysis different common 
pressures (system back pressure) were realized by varying the free volume of the guard 
containment. An alternate means of decay heat removal is the RCCS that surrounds the reactor 
vessel. Core decay heat is transferred to the reactor vessel by conduction and radiation and the 
RCCS absorbs the thermal energy from the reactor vessel directly by radiation and indirectly 
from the guard containment atmosphere by convection. The impact of the RCCS on the guard 
containment atmosphere and the maximum fuel temperature is the subject of the present study. 
3.1 ATHENA/RELAP5 Model 
In the current analysis heat structures and hydraulic volumes are added to represent the RCCS 
and the new system replaces the heat structure in the previous model that represented the reactor 
vessel support structure. The heat structures used in the ATHENA model for convective and 
radiative heat transfers are shown in Figure 3-1.  
Figure 3-1 – Reactor Vessel and Guard Containment Heat Structures. 
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The heated heat structures (HS), i.e. the fuel pins, identified in Figure 3-1 is the source of energy 
and the unheated heat structures are other components that participate in the exchange of thermal 
energy by radiation. In the previous analysis [3-1] the zone of influence of radiative heat transfer 
is assumed to be confined to the cylindrical section that coincides with the vertical extent of the 
fueled region of the core. As an example, though the core barrel (also, the reactor vessel wall, 
and the reactor vessel support structure) extends to the upper plenum, only the lower portion 
between the lower and upper boundaries of the fueled zone (1.347m in height) participates in 
radiative heat transfer. This assumption is relaxed in the current analysis to accommodate the 
RCCS that spans the entire height of the reactor vessel. In particular the entire core barrel now 
communicates radiatively with the full height of the reactor vessel wall and in turn the full height 
of the reactor vessel radiates to either the vessel support structure (old configuration) or the 
RCCS (new configuration).   
The ATHENA model for the RCCS is based on a set of input developed at INL [3-2]. As shown 
in Figure 3-2 the RCCS is modeled with three cylindrical heat structures that are concentric with 
the reactor vessel. The inner wall (HS 9700), closest to the reactor vessel is followed by the 
interior wall (HS 9701) and the outer wall (HS 9600) respectively. The incoming (down flow) 
and outgoing (up flow) streams of cooling water are separated by the interior wall. 
Figure 3-2 - ATHENA Model of the RCCS 
The inner wall is made of stainless steel and has a wall thickness of 0.0127m. This wall is in 
contact with the inner guard containment volume (042) that occupies the part of the guard 
containment that is within the confine of the RCCS and also includes the region above the 
reactor and the RCCS. The interior wall of the RCCS is modeled with a 0.01746m of low 
conductivity material. The outer wall of the RCCS has two layers, a 0.0127m of stainless steel 
and a 1m thick wall of concrete. The concrete wall is in contact with the atmosphere of the outer 
guard containment volume (070). The inner and outer guard containment volumes are connected 
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at the top and bottom to facilitate internal recirculation. The wall of the 44m high guard 
containment is modeled with a 0.02m concrete wall. 
 It is assumed in the ATHENA calculations that the outside surface of the guard containment 
wall is kept at a constant temperature of 30qC by a thermal management system embedded in the 
wall. The RCCS is assumed to be cooled by 30qC water and the flow is high enough to maintain 
the temperature rise to less than 1 deg. C. These two boundary conditions are set to maximize the 
cooling of the guard containment atmosphere by the containment wall and the RCCS. 
3.2 ATHENA Transient Analysis 
The new analysis with the addition of the RCCS is performed by using the same system model 
and the same depressurization accident as described in Ref [3-1]. With the modifications to the 
radiative heat transfer model for the core barrel, vessel wall, and vessel support structure, it 
becomes necessary to establish a new baseline analysis for use in comparison with the case of the 
RCCS. The new baseline case is similar to Case 4 described in Ref [3-1]. The depressurization 
accident is initiated by a 0.00645 m² (1.0 in²) rupture in the cold leg of one of the PCUs (4 loops 
of 600MW each). A guard containment free volume of 20250 m3 is assumed and the initial 
pressure and temperature of the guard containment atmosphere are one atmosphere and 30qC
respectively. 
3.2.1 Transient Cases 
Two transient cases have been run, one with and one without the RCCS. The later is the new 
base case. The benefits of having the RCCS are evident in the guard containment conditions. 
Both the pressure and temperature of the guard containment are lower in the case with RCCS 
(Case 5) than the case without (Case 4a, the base case) it. The trend of lower temperature 
however does not extend to the peak fuel temperature Results of the two cases, at the end of a 
24000s run, are summarized below. 
Case Identification Final Peak Fuel Temperature (K) 
Final Containment 
Pressure (MPa) 
Final Containment 
Temperature (K) 
Case 4a 
(No RCCS, Base Case) 1594 0.658 355. 
Case 5 
(With RCCS) 1772 0.611 325. 
It is noted that the maximum fuel temperature during the depressurization accident is only a few 
degrees from the final peak fuel temperature shown in the above table. With a lower guard 
containment pressure, the natural circulation flow established in the reactor is correspondingly 
lower in the case with RCCS. This then leads to a higher peak fuel temperature in Case 5. The 
result of the peak fuel temperature demonstrates that the predominant mode of decay heat 
removal is by convection while radiative heat transfer only serves a minor role in heat dissipation 
from the fuel. For the purpose of comparison, at the initial steady-state reactor power of 
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2400MW, the RCCS removes about 2MW of power while the emergency cooling system (ECS) 
removes about 20MW of power from the reactor at the end of the calculation at 24000s. 
It is noted that though Case 4a is the same transient as Case 4 in Ref. [3-1], the new analysis has 
a few modifications in the inputs for the heat structures. These changes resulted in a generally 
lower guard containment pressure and lower temperatures (fuel and guard containment) than 
before.
3.2.2 Analysis of Transient Results 
The progression of the depressurization transient for the two cases is very similar and the 
transient results for both cases are plotted together to facilitate comparison of trends. 
3.2.2.1 Heat Removal Rate of the Emergency Cooling System 
Plotted in Figure 3-3 is the rate of heat transfer into the water side of the HEATRIC heat 
exchanger in the emergency cooling system. The reactor power also is shown in the figure for 
comparison. The initial surge in the heat removal rate is due to the hydraulic transient on the 
water side of the heat exchanger as explained in Ref. 1. A comparison between Figures 3, 4 and 
5 shows that as the reactor pressure comes into equilibrium with the guard containment pressure, 
indicating an end to the depressurization phase of the transient, there is a slow migration of the 
heat exchanger heat removal rate towards the reactor power. This trend is indicative of the 
approach to a quasi-steady state where the natural circulation heat removal rate matches that of 
the reactor power. 
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Figure 3-3 – Reactor Power and Emergency Heat Exchanger Heat Removal Rate. 
3.2.2.2 Reactor Pressure 
The pressure of the reactor upper plenum is shown in Figure 3-4. With the initiation of the break 
at time zero, the current RELAP5/ATHENA model assumes a linear coast down of flow velocity 
from the power conversion unit (PCU) to the reactor. This is an interim scheme to simulate the 
behavior of a tripped PCU until a compressor/turbine model is developed for a more realistic 
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representation of the PCU. The mean initial pressure of the PCU is less than the reactor pressure. 
With no rotating machinery in the current model to provide hydraulic head in the PCU, helium 
gas in the reactor quickly depressurizes into the PCU volumes. This results in a rapid drop in 
reactor pressure at time zero. The rest of the depressurization is more gradual and is due to 
leakage through the break into the guard containment. For much of the depressurization transient 
the helium flow through the leak is choked and thus both cases have similar reactor pressure until 
the point at which the reactor pressure equalizes with the guard containment pressure. It is noted 
that the blow down takes a little longer in Case 5 than Case 4a. The reason is a lower back 
pressure in the latter (see Figure 3-5).  
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Figure 3-4 – Reactor Pressure in the Upper Plenum. 
3.2.2.3 Guard Containment Pressure 
There are several factors that determine the pressure build up in the guard containment after a 
leak in the reactor primary circuit. They are: 
1. Initial state of the guard containment atmosphere, i.e. temperature, pressure, and volume. 
2. Presence of heat structure to absorb sensible heat inside the guard containment. 
3. Presence of active cooling device in the guard containment. 
4. Through wall heat transfer to the outside. 
5. Energy and mass transfer through the leak into the guard containment. 
In Figure 3-5 the rate of pressure build up is seen to be faster for Case 4a than Case 5 and the 
former also has a higher containment pressure.  A peak pressure is reached when the reactor and 
guard containment have reached the same pressure and the combined heat removal from the 
Emergency Cooling System, Reactor Cavity Cooling System, and heat conduction through the 
guard containment wall exceeds the decay power. 
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Figure 3-5 – Guard Containment Pressure. 
3.2.2.4 Guard Containment Gas Temperature 
The gas temperature of the guard containment increases rapidly after the initiation of the 
depressurization accident because of the relatively low heat capacity of its atmosphere. Figure 3-
6 shows that the gas temperature is lower when the RCCS is included in the analysis. A high gas 
temperature is of concern not only for the environmental qualification of equipment and 
instruments inside the guard containment but also for the structural integrity of the support 
structures and the guard containment itself. 
3.2.2.5 Peak Fuel Temperature 
Figure 3-7 shows the peak fuel temperature as a function of time. It is obtained from the 
RELAP5/ATHENA results by defining a control variable that searches for the maximum 
temperature for all fuel heat structures at all axial locations. It is noted that there is little 
deviation between the peak fuel temperatures for the two cases until about 12000s when Case 4 
has finished its blow down. Before that time the two cases have the same reactor pressure and 
almost the same natural circulation flow (see Figure 3-8). In both cases the maximum fuel 
temperature during the transient is within the success criterion of 1873K, with the RCCS case 
(Case 5) exhibiting a closer approach to the limit. 
 36
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000 22000 24000
Time (s)
300
320
340
360
380
400
420
440
G
ua
rd
 C
on
ta
in
m
en
t V
ap
or
 T
em
pe
ra
tu
re
 (
K
)
Case 4a
Case 5
tempg-70010000
Figure 3-6 – Gas Temperature Inside the Guard Containment. 
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Figure 3-7 – Peak Fuel Temperature Core-wide. 
3.2.2.6 Helium Flow in Natural Circulation 
Natural circulation flow is established when the pressure difference across the check valve in the 
emergency heat exchanger loop has reached a threshold value. The helium flow rate shown in 
Figure 3-8 clearly demonstrates its dependence on the reactor pressure (see Figure 3-4). Higher 
flow rates are achieved at higher pressures and that is the reason for the base case to have a 
higher flow rate than the RCCS case when the system pressure has reached its quasi-steady state 
value. Based on economic and engineering constraints a maximum design pressure will be 
specified for the guard containment and that will have a direct bearing on the maximum passive 
heat removal rate achievable by natural circulation alone.   
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Figure 3-8 – Natural circulation flow rate of helium gas. 
3.2.2.7 Gas Temperature at Core Outlet 
The initial surge in the core inlet temperature, shown in Figure 3-10, is somewhat unrealistic and 
is due to an approximation in the current PCU model discussed earlier in relation to the reactor 
pressure. In general the trend of the core inlet temperature corresponds to the difference between 
the heat removal rate of the emergency heat exchanger and reactor power. A positive differential 
implies a decrease in core inlet temperature and vice versa. The core inlet temperature is very 
similar for both cases and the general trend follows the ECS heat exchanger heat removal rate 
shown in Figure 3-3. 
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Figure 3-9 – Gas temperature at core outlet. 
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Figure 3-10 – Gas temperature at core inlet. 
3.3 Summary and Conclusions 
The analysis presented here is an extension of Section 2 of this report (and can be found in [3-1]) 
of a depressurization transient for a 2400MW gas cooled reactor with a passive decay heat 
removal scheme based on natural circulation cooling. This new analysis includes the effects of a 
Reactor Cavity Cooling System that surrounds the reactor. The analysis shows that while the 
RCCS is good for lowering the guard containment pressure and temperature, its presence has a 
negative impact on the peak fuel temperature because the lower back pressure also reduces the 
natural circulation flow that removes most of the decay heat by convection. While the RCCS 
may be beneficial for other non-LOCA type accidents, its use in a depressurization accident 
would require further studies to evaluate the trade-offs. The same observation applies to other 
active or passive means of cooling the guard containment atmosphere. One example is the heat 
loss through the guard containment wall. Internal flow inside the guard containment tends to be 
quit complex and to correctly model the loss of heat by convection to the wall would require a 
more detailed analysis than what is possible with a system code. The capability to accommodate 
other break sizes should also be evaluated in the design of the guard containment. It is also 
recognized that the accident analysis will not be complete without the power conversion unit 
being properly modeled. 
3.4 References 
[3-1] Cheng, L., Ludewig, H. and Jo, J., “Passive Decay Heat Removal for a 2400 MW Pin 
Core by Natural Circulation,” BNL report submitted to the DOE GEN-IV Program, 
January 2005. 
[3-2] Davis, C., Personal communication with L. Cheng (Electronic files related to major 
improvements made to the RELAP5-3D/ATHENA computer code for analysis of the 
GFR as part of an annual report (2004) for an INL LDRD), April 7, 2005. 
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4. Modeling of the Power Conversion Unit (PCU) 
As part of the system design and safety analysis of a direct-cycle gas cooled fast reactor (GCFR) 
ATHENA calculations [4-1,4-2] have been done to study passive decay heat removal by natural 
circulation cooling in the case of a depressurization accident. It has been recognized from the 
results of initial analyses that the coolant flow due to the coast down of the turbomachinery of 
the power conversion unit (PCU) is an important factor in initially cooling the core following 
reactor scram, and in establishing the natural circulation flow. Currently this flow is 
approximated by linearly reducing the flow velocity to zero in 180 seconds. A more realistic 
model of this flow reduction (both mass flow rate and time) is required to make more accurate 
estimates of the maximum fuel temperature, and ultimately the guard containment volume. In 
order to carry out this more realistic calculation a complete PCU model is required. This interim 
report discusses progress made in the detail modeling of the PCU that will become part of the 
ATHENA model of the GFR plant system. 
4.1 GT-MHR Power Conversion Unit 
The power conversion unit (PCU) of interest is a design that is being developed by General 
Atomics (GA) and its Russian partner for a 600 MWt Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor 
(GT-MHR). Conceptual design of the GT-MHR was done by GA [4-3], and further development 
is being carried out in Russian with support from the US government [4-4]. A PCU has two 
major parts, the turbomachinery and the heat exchangers. A node diagram showing the gas 
volumes in a PCU is shown in Figure 4-1. 
Figure 4-1 – Node Diagram of Power Conversion Unit. 
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The components of a PCU are housed in a vertical vessel that is placed near the reactor. The 
PCU and the reactor are connected by a short cross vessel that is made up of an inner hot duct 
and a concentric outer cold duct. Components of the turbomachinery, namely, the generator, 
turbine, low and high pressure compressors, are all on one shaft. The heat exchangers consist of 
recuperator, precooler, and intercooler. A bypass valve that connects the high and low pressure 
side of the PCU is used for the over-speed protection of the turbine. Geometric data for the 
various gas volumes in the PCU are from Ref. [4-5] and they are summarized in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1 - Geometric Data for a 600 MWt PCU 
Component Length (m) 
Volume 
(m3)
Area 
(m2)
Orientation 
(Degree) 
Hydraulic 
Diameter (m) 
Hot Duct 7.4 11.885 1.606 0 1.43
Turbine 4.2 2.04 0.4857 90 0.7864
Turb - Recu 1.3848 0.6924 0.5 -90 0.7979
Recuperator-LP* 2.8152 59.5 21.135 -90 ???
Recu - Prec 10.95 5.475 0.5 -90 0.7979
Precooler 4.73 134.48 28.431 -90 0.009924
LPC duct 4.9 11.786 2.405 90 1.75
LPC inlet 2.38 14.239 5.983 90 2.76
LPC 4.2 2 0.4762 90 0.7787
LPC outlet 4.9 21.3 4.347 -90 2.353
Intercooler 4.73 134.08 28.346 -90 0.009924
Intc - HPC 9.63 4.815 0.5 90 0.7979
HPC 4.2 2 0.4762 90 0.7787
HPC-Recu 2 1 0.5 0 0.7979
Recuperator-HP** 2.8152 59.5 21.135 90 ???
Recu - Cduct 2.8152 1.4076 0.5 -90 0.7979
Cold Duct 7.4 13.949 1.8850 0 0.6
Total Volume 480.15
*   LP = low pressure side of recuperator. 
** HP = high pressure side of recuperator. 
Stand-alone ATHENA models of the turbine, compressors, recuperator, precooler, and 
intercooler have been prepared. In general the predicted thermal capacities of the components are 
within a few percent of the values shown in Table 4-2. 
4.2 Helium Brayton Cycle 
The thermal cycle utilized in a GT-MHR plant is a recuperative gas turbine cycle with 
intermediate cooling. Helium from the reactor enters the PCU via the hot gas duct inside the 
cross vessel and expands in the gas turbine. The turbine drives the rotor of the generator and the 
two compressors (low and high pressure). After the turbine, the helium returns much of the 
remaining thermal energy back to the cycle via a high efficiency recuperator. A precooler 
removes heat from the helium to the ultimate heat sink when the gas emerges from the low 
pressure side of the recuperator. Then a low pressure compressor pressurizes the gas before an 
intermediate cooler removes more heat from the helium. A high pressure compressor raises the 
helium pressure before the gas comes into the high pressure side of the recuperator. From there 
the helium flows to the reactor via the annular space between the hot duct and the wall of the 
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cross vessel. In the reactor, the helium gas passes through the core and closes the Brayton cycle. 
The state points of the helium at various stages of the cycle are summarized in Table 2 [4-5, 4-6]. 
The thermal capacity shown in the table is based on information from Ref. [4-7]. 
Table 4-2 – Helium State Points 
Component Inlet Conditions Outlet Conditions Thermal Capacity 
Turbine 848 qC7.07 MPa
508 qC
2.61 MPa 558.5 MW 
Recuperator 
(Low Pressure) 
508 qC
2.61 MPa 
qC
2.58 MPa 639 MW 
Precooler qC2.58 MPa 
qC
2.55 MPa 173 MW 
Low Pressure 
Compressor 
qC
2.55 MPa 
qC
4.31 MPa 132.3 MW 
Intercooler qC4.31 MPa 
qC
4.28 MPa 130.2 MW 
High Pressure 
Compressor 
qC
4.28 MPa 
qC
7.24 MPa 134.5 MW 
Recuperator 
(High Pressure) 
qC
7.24 MPa 
qC
7.16 MPa 639 MW 
4.3 Turbomachinery 
The primary components of the turbomachinery consist of the generator, the turbine, and the low 
and high pressure compressors. The rotating parts are all mounted vertically on one shaft. Some 
of the mechanical characteristics of the turbomachinery, such as mass, size, and capacity are 
summarized in Ref. [4-8]. 
4.3.1 Turbine 
Since the performance data for the multi-stage turbine is not available only an approximate 
ATHENA model is used to represent the gas turbine. It is modeled as a single stage type 2 
turbine, i.e. constant efficient stage. 
4.3.2 Low and High Pressure Compressors 
Again only approximate models are used to represent the compressors. The pump model is used 
as a surrogate for the compressor because the released version of ATHENA (ver. 2.2.4) did not 
have the compressor model yet. Had the compressor model been available the lack of 
performance characteristics for the compressors would still make the construction of an 
ATHENA model for the GT-MHR compressors difficult. 
4.4 Heat Exchanger 
Located in the annular space between the turbine-compressors and the PCU vessel is the 
recuperator, the precooler and the intercooler. The coolers are cooled by running water that 
transfers heat to the ultimate heat sink. 
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4.4.1 Recuperator 
Helium gas, to and from the reactor, flow on opposite side of the recuperator. The recuperator is 
a vertical modular heat exchanger with plate-fin heat transfer surface and operating with 
countercurrent flow [4-7, 4-8, 4-9, and 4-10]. The heat transfer coefficient calculated by 
ATHENA for a flat plate is adjusted by using the fouling factor input to achieve the desired heat 
transfer rate for a given flow and surface area. 
4.4.2 Precooler and Intercooler 
The precooler and the intercooler have similar design [4-7, 4-8, and 4-11]. They are both 
modular vertical heat exchangers. Each module consists of a number of straight tubes with outer 
fins and the tubes are arranged in a triangular array. Cooling water flows inside the tubes. A 
displacer rod located inside each tube enhances the heat transfer by increasing the flow velocity. 
Helium flows on the outside of the tubes, countercurrent to the water flow. 
4.5 Future Work 
In order to complete this model of the PCU, it will require the appropriate performance maps for 
the turbine and the compressors, inertia of the rotating parts, and more detail geometry of the 
heat transfer surfaces and flow channels in the heat exchangers. Once the stand-alone models are 
ready the next step is to integrate the components into one system and have all rotating parts on 
one shaft. 
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The current reference design of the GFR operates at a relatively high power density, but has very 
little thermal inertia to aid in decay heat removal during accident conditions.  The low thermal 
inertia, coupled with a working fluid that has poor heat transfer characteristics, creates a major 
challenge for the GFR with respect to passive decay heat removal during accident conditions; 
specifically for loss-of-coolant and loss-of-flow accidents.  Conductive and radiative heat 
transfer alone cannot effectively remove the decay heat, where natural convective cooling is also 
needed if passive systems are to remain as a viable option. 
Based on the work performed to date on safety system design for decay heat removal, the 
following conclusions can be made: 
1. A fully passively safe GFR design is possible with low power density, but the economics 
can be prohibitive. 
2. To reduce the economic burden of a fully passively safe system, a backpressure is needed 
to enhance natural convective cooling during off-normal events.  The higher the 
backpressure, the more effective the cooling based on the main driving force for natural 
convection: mass flow.  Thus increased mass (or higher pressure) enhances natural 
convection.  However, the containment must withstand these pressures for extended 
periods of time, which would require a higher cost for the containment.  Conversely, a 
guard (or secondary) vessel could be designed to withstand the needed backpressure at a 
lower cost.  (This report focuses on this safety system design variant.) 
3. Heavy gas injection enhances natural convection, and reduces the backpressure needed to 
remove the decay heat due to the increased mass of the working fluid. 
4. While not passive, use of active systems require very little power (~ 100kW x 3), where 
their reliability may be better than their passive counterparts. 
5. Active/passive combined systems require a minimal backpressure, and only ~ 16kW (x 3) 
for the active side.  As stated earlier in this report, this scenario would require that a 
blower is run for the first 24 hours of an accident, at which point it can be shut down to 
allow solely natural convective cooling to occur for the remainder of the accident period. 
The GFR research effort has been focused on items 2 and 5 to maintain the ideals of using 
passive safety as much as is reasonably achievable given the other Generation IV goals.  
However, as shown within this report, other issues will need further study (e.g., cooling the 
guard containment reduces the pressure of the working fluid, which decreases the effective 
cooling of the core).  Future work will focus on the trade-offs within items 2 and 5, and work 
will begin on more detailed analyses of using item 3 and its trade-offs.  In addition, related U-
NERI work will take a preliminary look at the reliability aspects of item 4, which will also affect 
item 5. 
